

APR - 3 2012

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

Phil Lombardi, Clerk U.S. DISTRICT COURT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,)		
)		
Plaintiff,)		
)		
v.) (Case No.	12-CR-033-GKF
)		
GREGG ALAN JACKSON,)		
)		
Defendant.)		

PLEA AGREEMENT PURSUANT TO FEDERAL RULE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 11(c)(1)(C)

The United States of America, by and through Thomas Scott Woodward, United States Attorney for the Northern District of Oklahoma, and Ryan L. Souders, Assistant United States Attorney, and the defendant, GREGG ALAN JACKSON, in person and through counsel, Julia O'Connell, respectfully inform the Court that they have reached the following plea agreement pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(C).

1. Plea

The defendant agrees to enter a voluntary plea of guilty to the following:

Count Two: 18 U.S.C. § 4 - Misprision of a Felony

as set forth in the Indictment in the instant case, Northern District of Oklahoma, and admits to being in fact guilty as charged in the count to which the defendant is pleading guilty.

2. Waiver of Constitutional Rights

The defendant understands that, by pleading guilty, the following constitutional rights will be relinquished:

- a. the right to be indicted if proceeding by Information;
- b. the right to plead not guilty;
- c. the right to be tried by a jury, or, if the defendant wishes and with the consent of the Government, to be tried by a judge;
- d. at trial, the defendant has the right to an attorney, and if defendant could not afford an attorney, the Court would appoint one to represent the defendant;
 - e. the defendant has the right to assist in the selection of the jury;
- f. during trial, the defendant would be presumed innocent, and a jury would be instructed that the Government has the burden to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and by a unanimous verdict;
- g. the defendant has the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses against the defendant;
- h. if desired, the defendant could testify on the defendant's own behalf and present witnesses in the defendant's defense;
- i. if the defendant did not wish to testify, that fact could not be used against the defendant, and a jury would be so instructed;
- j. if the defendant were found guilty after a trial, the defendant would have the right to appeal that verdict to determine if any errors had been committed during trial that would require either a new trial or a dismissal of the charges; and
- k. at trial, the defendant would be entitled to have a jury determine beyond a reasonable doubt any facts which may have the effect of increasing the defendant's mandatory minimum or maximum sentence.

By pleading guilty, the defendant will be giving up all of these rights. By pleading guilty, the defendant understands that the defendant may have to answer questions posed to defendant by the Court, both about the rights that the defendant will be giving up and the factual basis for the defendant's plea.

3. Appellate and Post-Conviction Waiver

In consideration of the promises and concessions made by the United States in this plea agreement, the defendant knowingly and voluntarily agrees to the following terms:

- a. The defendant waives the right to directly appeal the conviction and sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and/or 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a);
- b. The defendant reserves the right to appeal from a sentence which exceeds the statutory maximum;
- c. The defendant expressly acknowledges and agrees that the United States reserves all rights to appeal the defendant's sentence as set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3742(b), and *U.S. v. Booker*, 543 U.S. 220 (2005);
- d. The defendant waives the right to collaterally attack the conviction and sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, except for claims based on ineffective assistance of counsel which challenge the validity of the guilty plea or this waiver;
- e. The defendant waives the right to have the sentence modified pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3582(c)(1)(B) and 3582(c)(2), except for a Rule 35(b) motion filed by the Government; and

The defendant expressly acknowledges that counsel has explained his appellate and post-conviction rights; that defendant understands his rights; and that defendant knowingly and voluntarily waives those rights as set forth above.

GREGG ALAN JACKSON

4. Freedom of Information Act Waiver

The defendant waives all rights, whether asserted directly or by a representative, to request or to receive from any department or agency of the United States any records pertaining to the investigation or prosecution of this case including, without limitation, any records that may be sought under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552, or the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a.

5. Rule 11 Rights Waiver

The defendant knowingly and expressly waives all of the rights afforded defendant pursuant to the provisions of Rule 11(f) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. In other words, after entry of a plea made pursuant to this plea agreement, and in consideration thereof, the following shall be admissible against the defendant:

- a. A plea of guilty which is later withdrawn or which the defendant seeks to withdraw;
- b. Any statement made in the course of any proceeding under Rule 11 regarding said plea of guilty;
- c. Any statement made in the course of plea discussions with an attorney or agent for the Government, or which were made pursuant to a proffer letter agreement, which result in a plea of guilty later withdrawn.

6. Waiver of Right to Jury Trial on Sentencing Factors

The defendant, by entering this plea, also waives the right to have facts that determine the offense level under the Sentencing Guidelines (including facts that support any specific offense characteristic or other enhancement or adjustment) (1) charged in the Indictment,

(2) proven to a jury, or (3) proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant explicitly consents to have the sentence based on facts to be established by a preponderance of the evidence before the sentencing judge pursuant to *United States v. Crockett*, 435 F.3d 1305 (10th Cir. 2006), and *United States v. Magallanez*, 408 F.3d 672 (10th Cir. 2005), and to allow the Court to consider any reliable evidence without regard to its admissibility at trial. The defendant explicitly acknowledges that his plea to the charged offense authorizes the Court to impose any sentence up to and including the maximum sentence set forth in the United States Code. The defendant also waives all challenges to the constitutionality of the Sentencing Guidelines.

7. Payment of Monetary Penalties

The defendant understands that the Court may impose a fine pursuant to the Sentencing Guidelines. The defendant agrees, as a part of this agreement, to submit to interviews by the United States Attorney's Financial Litigation Unit regarding the defendant's financial status, and to complete and submit a financial statement, under oath, not later than two weeks after the date of this plea agreement. The defendant understands that, by law, interest accrues on any remaining balance of the debt.

8. Special Assessment

The defendant hereby agrees to pay the total amount required for the Special Monetary Assessment (\$100 per felony count) to the United States District Court Clerk before the time of the sentencing hearing or as directed by the District Court.

9. Factual Basis and Elements

The elements that the United States must prove beyond a reasonable doubt in order to convict under 18 U.S.C. § 4 are as follows:

First:

a federal felony was committed, as charged in Count One of the

Indictment;

Second:

the defendant had knowledge of the commission of that felony;

Third:

the defendant failed to notify an authority as soon as possible. An "authority" includes a federal judge or some other federal civil or military authority, such as a federal grand jury, Secret Service

or FBI agent; and

Forth:

the defendant did an affirmative act, as charged, to conceal the

crime.

In regard to the factual basis required by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(b)(3), the defendant agrees and stipulates that there is a factual basis for the plea of guilty and relieves the United States of any further obligation to adduce such evidence.

The defendant, **GREGG ALAN JACKSON**, admits knowingly, willfully and intentionally committing or causing to be committed the acts constituting the crime alleged in Count Two in the instant case, and confesses to the Court that the defendant is, in fact, guilty of such crime.

I, GREGG ALAN JACKSON, admit that on April 25, 2011, I started a fire outside of my rented apartment at 4652 South Fulton Avenue, in Tulsa, Oklahoma, which is in the Northern District of Oklahoma. In so starting the fire, I attempted to damage and did damage, by means of fire, the building and real property, which was rental property and therefore used in interstate commerce and in activities affecting interstate commerce. This conduct constituted a felony in the Northern District of Oklahoma.

I further admit that on that same date, the Tulsa Fire Department extinguished this fire, arrested me, and read me my rights under *Miranda*, which I waived and agreed to speak with the investigator.

I further admit that at that time, I knew I had committed the felony charged in Count One. Instead of reporting the crime to the investigator, however, I took the affirmative steps of first, denying knowledge of the origin of the fire, and second, giving a false alibi in which I claimed to have been elsewhere when the fire was started, both of which affirmative steps were designed to conceal the crime I committed.

I further admit that since that first interview, I have had numerous opportunities to notify other authorities about the felony, including, a task force officer with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, but I have failed to report the crime and instead have continued to rely on my affirmative concealment of that crime.

GREGGALAN JACKSON

Defendant

Date

10. Further Prosecution

The United States shall not initiate additional criminal charges against the defendant in the Northern District of Oklahoma that, as of the date of the defendant's acceptance of this agreement, arise from its investigation of the defendant's actions and conduct giving rise to the instant Indictment, save and except crimes of violence and criminal acts involving violations investigated by the United States Internal Revenue Service. The defendant understands, however, that this obligation is subject to all "Limitations" set forth below, and that the United States Attorney's Office for the Northern District of Oklahoma is free to prosecute the defendant for any illegal conduct (*i.e.*, violation of federal criminal laws) not discovered by or revealed to the Government during its investigation or occurring after the date of this agreement.

11. Rule 11(c)1(C)

The United States agrees to join with the defense counsel in recommending that the defendant be sentenced under the provisions of Rule 11(c)(1)(C), as set forth in the stipulations section in paragraph 14 and elsewhere in this plea agreement.

12. <u>Dismissal of Remaining Counts</u>

If the Court finds the defendant's plea of guilty to be freely and voluntarily made and accepts the plea, then the United States will move, at the appropriate time, to dismiss the remaining counts in the instant case, if any, as to this defendant.

Defendant's initials

If the defendant's guilty plea is rejected, withdrawn, vacated, or reversed at any time, the United States will be free to prosecute the defendant for all charges of which it then has knowledge, and any charges that have been dismissed will be automatically reinstated or may be re-presented to a grand jury with jurisdiction over the matter. In such event, the defendant hereby waives any objections, motions or defenses based upon the applicable statute of limitations, the Speedy Trial Act, or constitutional restrictions as to the time of bringing such charges.

13. Acceptance of Responsibility

Provided the defendant clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility, the United States agrees to recommend a two-level reduction in offense level pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1. The United States agrees to file a motion recommending that the defendant receive an additional one-level reduction pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b) if the defendant is otherwise eligible therefor. The sentencing judge is in a unique position to evaluate the acceptance of responsibility, and the Court's determination will provide the final approval or disapproval of any Section 3E1.1 point level reduction for timely acceptance of responsibility.

The obligations of the Government herein, relative to acceptance of responsibility are contingent upon the defendant's continuing manifestation of acceptance of responsibility as determined by the United States. If the defendant falsely denies, or makes conflicting statements as to, his involvement in the crime to which he is pleading, falsely denies or

frivolously contests relevant conduct that the Court determines to be true, willfully obstructs, or attempts to obstruct or impede the administration of justice as defined in U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, or perpetrates or attempts to perpetrate crimes while awaiting sentencing, or advances false or frivolous issues in mitigation, the United States expressly reserves the right to withdraw any recommendation regarding acceptance of responsibility without breaching the agreement.

14. Sentence

a. <u>Imprisonment</u>

The defendant acknowledges that under 18 U.S.C. § 4 the maximum statutory sentence is three (3) years imprisonment and a fine of not more than \$250,000.

b. Supervised Release

Additionally, the defendant is aware, if imprisonment is imposed, that the Court shall include as part of the sentence a requirement that the defendant be placed on a term of supervised release after imprisonment not to exceed one (1) year.

If the term of supervised release for any count of conviction is revoked, the defendant may be imprisoned for an additional term not to exceed the term of imprisonment authorized in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) for the offense of conviction, with no credit being given for any time served while on supervised release. Further, if the crime of conviction occurred after September 13, 1994, the Court may impose another term of supervised release following any term of imprisonment imposed for a violation of supervised release conditions, and this term

Defendants Initials

of supervised release may not exceed the term of supervised release originally authorized by statute for the offense of conviction less any term of imprisonment that was imposed upon revocation of supervised release (18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) and (h)). If a second or subsequent term of supervised release is revoked, the Court may impose another term of imprisonment not to exceed the difference between any imprisonment imposed for a prior revocation of supervised release for the offense of conviction and the term of imprisonment authorized pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). Accordingly, the original term of imprisonment when combined with any term of imprisonment arising from revocations of supervised release, may result in a total amount of imprisonment greater than the statutory maximum term for the offense of conviction.

c. Guidelines

The defendant is aware that the Sentencing Guidelines promulgated pursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 at 18 U.S.C. § 3551 through § 3742, and 28 U.S.C. § 991 through § 998, are advisory. The district courts, while not bound to apply the Sentencing Guidelines, must consult those Guidelines and take them into account when sentencing. *See* 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a).

The sentence imposed in federal court is without parole. The defendant is further aware that the sentence has not yet been determined by the Court, that any estimate of the likely sentence received from any source is a prediction, not a promise, and that the Court has the final discretion to impose any sentence up to the statutory maximum. The defendant

Defendant's Initials

further understands that all recommendations or requests by the United States pursuant to this agreement are not binding upon the Court.

If the sentencing Court should impose any sentence up to the maximum established by statute, the defendant cannot, for that reason alone, withdraw defendant's guilty plea, but will remain bound to fulfill all of defendant's obligations under this agreement.

Nothing in this plea agreement, save and except any stipulations contained herein, limits the right of the United States to present to the Court or Probation Office, either orally or in writing, any and all facts and arguments relevant to the defendant's sentence that are available to the United States at the time of sentencing. The defendant acknowledges hereby that relevant conduct, that is, conduct charged in any dismissed count and all other uncharged related criminal activities, will be used in the calculation of the sentence. The United States reserves its full opportunity to speak pursuant to Rule 32(i)(4)(A)(iii) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.

The defendant is further aware, if the Court accepts this Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement, the Court will impose a sentence in conformity with the agreement of the parties in this case. If the Court rejects this Rule 11(c)(1)(C) agreement, the Court will allow the defendant to withdraw his guilty plea, or will not accept the tendered guilty plea, as provided in Rule 11(c)(5).

15. Stipulations

The defendant and the United States agree and stipulate to the following facts:

a. Pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(C), the appropriate disposition in this case is a sentence of three (3) years of imprisonment. This agreed-upon sentence represents an upward departure of approximately 18 months from the high-end of the anticipated Guidelines range for Count Two of the Indictment. An upward departure is reasonable based on the aggravated nature of the underlying arson felony, which the defendant failed to report and affirmatively sought to conceal. A conviction as to Count One would have required the defendant to serve a minimum of five years of imprisonment.

It is understood that neither the Court nor the United States Probation Office is bound by the foregoing stipulations, either as to questions of fact or as to determination of the correct advisory sentencing guideline calculation, except as provided by Rule 11(c)(1)(C).

Having been fully apprised by defense counsel of defendant's right to seek compensation pursuant to Public Law 105-119, the defendant **WAIVES** any and all such right, and stipulates that defendant is not a "prevailing party" in connection with this case.

16. Limitations

This plea agreement shall be binding and enforceable upon the Office of the United States Attorney for the Northern District of Oklahoma, but in no way limits, binds or otherwise affects the rights, powers, duties or obligations of any state or local law enforcement agency, administrative or regulatory authorities, civil or administrative enforcement, collection, bankruptcy, adversary proceedings or suits which have been or may be filed by any governmental entity, including without limitation, the Internal Revenue Service, the Tax Division of the Department of Justice and the trustee in bankruptcy.

17. Breach of Agreement

In the event either party believes the other has failed to fulfill any obligations under this agreement, then the complaining party shall, in its discretion, have the option of petitioning the Court to be relieved of its obligations herein. Whether or not a party has completely fulfilled all of its obligations under this agreement shall be determined by the Court in an appropriate proceeding at which any disclosures and documents provided by either party shall be admissible and at which the complaining party shall be required to establish any breach by a preponderance of the evidence. The defendant hereby **WAIVES** any right under Rule 11(d) and (e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to withdraw from defendant's plea and this agreement, save and except under circumstances where the Court rejects the plea agreement under Rule 11(c)(5) and except for the limited reasons outlined above in this paragraph.

In the event that GREGG ALAN JACKSON, after entry of a plea of guilty, unsuccessfully attempts to withdraw the defendant's plea of guilty, the United States may continue to enforce the agreement but will no longer be bound by any particular provision in this agreement. This provision will not have any continued vitality if it is determined by the Court that the United States acted in bad faith to bring about the attempted withdrawal of plea.

18. Conclusion

No agreements, representations or understandings have been made between the parties in this case, other than those which are explicitly set forth in this plea agreement and the Plea Agreement Supplement that the United States will file in this case (as is routinely done in every case, even though there may or may not be any additional terms) and none will be entered into unless executed in writing and signed by all of the parties.

SO AGREED:

THOMAS SCOTT WOODWARD UNITED STATES ATTORNEY		
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Ryan L. Souders	Dated	
Assistant United States Attorney		
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Jui L. O'Cornell	4/3/20/2	
Julia O'Connell	Dated	
Attorney for Defendant		

Gregg Alan Jackson

Dated

4/3/12

I have read this agreement and carefully reviewed every part of it with my attorney. I understand it, and I voluntarily agree to it. Further, I have consulted with my attorney and fully understand my rights with respect to sentencing which may apply to my case. No other promises or inducements have been made to me, other than those contained in this pleading. In addition, no one has threatened or forced me in any way to enter into this agreement.

Finally, */am satisfied with the representation of my attorney in this matter.

Gregg Alah Jackson

Dated

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I am counsel for the defendant in this case. I have fully explained to the defendant the defendant's rights with respect to the pending *Indictment/Information. Further, I have reviewed the provisions of the <u>Sentencing Guidelines and Policy Statements</u> and I have fully explained to the defendant the provisions of those Guidelines which may apply in this case. I have carefully reviewed every part of this plea agreement with the defendant. To my knowledge, the defendant's decision to enter into this agreement is an informed and voluntary one.

Julia O'Connell

Counsel for the Defendant

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